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This paper tests the hypothesis that low-income women’s likelihood of choosing abortion will 
decrease as their access to and participation in social welfare programs increases. Though an 
affirmative finding could challenge the coherence of a morally and fiscally conservative 
Republican coalition and thus improve prospects for the safety net’s political future, findings 
from a sample of low-SES, urban mothers do not support this hypothesis. Welfare program 
participation and state welfare generosity are positively associated with the likelihood of 
choosing abortion. The existence and magnitude of this relationship, however, is mediated by the 
rules of state welfare bureaucracies and also varies by women’s race and marital status. 
Limitations on abortion access appear to reduce abortions, while the nongovernmental safety net 
does not affect abortion decisions.
The Fragile Families study was funded by a grant from NICHD (#R01HD36916) and a 
consortium of private foundations. Persons interested in obtaining Fragile Families contract data 
should see http://crcw.princeton.edu/fragilefamiles/data.asp for further information.
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Are Social Welfare Policies ‘Pro-Life’?
An Individual-Level Analysis of Low-Income Women
This paper tests the hypothesis that low-income women’s likelihood of choosing abortion will 
decrease as their access to and participation in social welfare programs increases. Though an 
affirmative finding could challenge the coherence of a morally and fiscally conservative 
Republican coalition and thus improve prospects for the safety net’s political future, findings 
from a sample of low-SES, urban mothers do not support this hypothesis. Welfare program 
participation and state welfare generosity are positively associated with the likelihood of 
choosing abortion. The existence and magnitude of this relationship, however, is mediated by the 
rules of state welfare bureaucracies and also varies by women’s race and marital status. 
Limitations on abortion access appear to reduce abortions, while the nongovernmental safety net 
does not affect abortion decisions.3
These are uncertain times for the American social safety net. Debate over the welfare state 
intensified during the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in a 1996 reform bill that ended cash welfare 
as a federal entitlement, tightened work requirements and other conditions for welfare eligibility, 
and placed a time limit on welfare receipt (Lieberman and Shaw 2000; Soss et al. 2001). While 
other aspects of the welfare state have not eroded at the same pace, lawmakers are pondering 
downsizing or privatizing even such popular programs as Social Security and Medicare (Hacker 
2002; Hacker 2004; Weir 1998). Mounting budget deficits (Hacker and Pierson 2005), polarized 
parties that play to the middle class (Weir 1998), and public antipathy toward “welfare” (Gilens 
1999) combine with more stable factors such as low-income Americans’ relative lack of political 
influence (APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy 2004) to dim prospects for 
strengthening those public assistance programs aimed at the economically disadvantaged. 
Yet not every proposal to tighten welfare programs for the poor made it into the 1996 
reform. The introduction of a cross-cutting issue, abortion, reframed the debate over one specific 
proposal and played a key role in its defeat. This small victory suggests a potentially fruitful new 
approach to some aspects of welfare politics, and sets off the prior empirical inquiry with which 
this paper is more immediately concerned—the connection between welfare programs and the 
abortion decisions of low-income women. 
Abortion surfaced most clearly in the debate over a reform proposal called the “family 
cap,” because it “capped” the number of children the government would support at the number a 
family had when applying for welfare. This would end the previous practice of increasing 
families’ grants when new children were born, and was strongly supported by conservatives as 
discouraging out-of-wedlock childbearing and welfare dependency. The debate complicated 
when the National Right to Life Committee, the Catholic Church, and others argued that the 4
denial of assistance could force more poor women to have abortions (Joffe 1998).  This split in 
the Republicans’ moral issues base effectively defeated the proposal, as the final bill left the 
matter to the states.
This debate elucidated tension in a fiscally and morally conservative GOP platform. It 
has not gone unnoticed by other scholars and commentators (Mirkin and Okun 1994; Pollitt 
1999; Schroedel 2000). Since political elites of all stripes claim to want to reduce abortion 
(Clinton 2005; Feminists For Life of America 2001), assistance programs figure prominently in 
calls for “common ground” in abortion politics (Dionne 2005; Goggin 1993a; Mathewes-Green 
1995; Mirkin and Okun 1994; Tribe 1990). Two widely-circulated op-eds of the 2004 
presidential campaign went so far as to suggest that a vote for a fiscally liberal administration 
was the truly “pro-life” vote (Roche 2004; Stassen 2004). The rationale behind these arguments 
is that the expansive social and economic policies promoted by liberals would better protect 
families from economic hardship and would defray the material and opportunity costs of 
childbearing, making abortion less necessary. 
This paper puts the latter argument to an empirical test. Does more generous social 
welfare policy reduce abortion? While research in population studies, psychology, and health 
shows that economic hardship is a major reason behind many women’s abortion decisions (Faria, 
Barrett, and Goodman 1985; Finer et al. 2005; Freeman 1978; Glander et al. 1998; McIntyre, 
Anderson, and McDonald 2001; Torres and Forrest 1988), much less is known about how social 
welfare policy might affect abortion usage. The question is newer still to political scientists, 
despite their calls for more study of how public policy affects abortion rates (Goggin 1993b). 
A finding that social welfare generosity is associated with lower levels of abortion could 
have important implications for the future of the safety net and for American electoral politics. 5
At issue is the coherence of the Republican coalition and its position on social welfare, given the 
party’s official stance on abortion. Further, it would be a positive contribution to the literature on 
the behavioral effects of welfare policy, one that has largely emphasized “negative” effects such 
as long-term dependence, disincentives to work and marriage (Mead 1992; Murray 1984), 
encouragement of nonmarital childbearing (Moffitt 1997), and the migration of welfare 
recipients to states with the highest benefits (Bailey 2005; Peterson and Rom 1989). 
Theoretical Perspective: Policy Tools and Human Behavior
This investigation draws its theoretical perspective from the literature on policy 
implementation and compliance. This literature studies governmental institutions’ effectiveness 
at influencing individual behavior through policy tools, as well as the factors that affect policy 
choice. It assumes that public policy aims “to get people to do things that they might not 
otherwise do; or it enables people to do things that they might not have done otherwise” 
(Schneider and Ingram 1990, p. 513). This paper’s concern is with the latter aim and with one 
particular category of policy options that Schneider and Ingram call “capacity-building tools.” 
Salamon (1981) proposes that the analysis of policy tools center on two questions. The 
first concerns how the choice of one option rather than another contributes to the effectiveness of 
a government program. The second concerns the political or other factors that influenced 
selection of the winning alternative. My focus is on the first. This paper attempts to gauge the 
impact of social welfare generosity on abortion usage. Additionally, I compare the potential 
effectiveness of this capacity-building tool, favored by liberals who affiliate with the Democratic 
party, to alternatives favored by conservatives who associate with the Republican party. These 
are the private safety net and regulation of abortion, the latter of which fits Schneider and 
Ingram’s taxonomy most appropriately as an “authority tool”. 6
Why might social welfare be capacity-building in the context of abortion decisions? 
One of the earliest articulations of welfare programs as capacity-building tools for would-
be mothers was the account of the Swedish welfare state reforms by scholar and policy maker 
Alva Myrdal (Myrdal 1968 (1941)). According to Myrdal, Sweden developed one of the world’s 
most generous welfare states to increase its sagging birth rate while avoiding interventions that 
would make parenthood anything but voluntary. This strategy reflected her belief that the decline 
in birth rates had been driven by reasons other than personal preference—that many women were 
undergoing unwanted abortions out of economic desperation, and many more were avoiding 
pregnancy solely because they could not afford children, especially in combination with work. 
During the mid-twentieth century, social welfare policies became important and explicit 
components of many European countries’ pronatalist population policy, though sometimes in 
combination with propaganda or changes in marriage and abortion law. The capacity-building 
tools in these policy packages typically dealt with child care supply and affordability, leave time, 
and financial assistance to parents (Besemeres 1981). Some researchers have found that these 
economic incentives did indeed reverse countries’ declining birth rates and proceeded to sustain 
them over subsequent years (Buttner and Lutz 1990; Frejka 1980; Legge Jr. and Alford 1986), 
while others are more guarded in their assessments (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Monnier 1990). 
One study that compared countries along their relative policy emphasis on economic incentives 
for childbearing versus restrictions on abortion concluded that economic incentives were 
considerably more effective at increasing birth rates (Legge Jr. and Alford 1986).
Much scholarship on abortion demand in the U.S. also implies a capacity-building role 
for economic assistance, drawing from economic theories of fertility and a rational choice 
framework (Garbacz 1990; Gohmann and Ohsfeldt 1993; Grossman and Joyce 1990; Jewell and 7
Brown 2000; Joyce and Kaestner 1996; Leibowitz, Eisen, and Chow 1986; Medoff 2002; 
Powell-Griner and Trent 1987). According to this theory, abortion demand rises with the relative 
cost of childbearing, where cost encompasses monetary cost, psychic cost, and foregone 
opportunities. Thus abortion should be most common among poor, young, or highly educated 
professional women. Its utilization should also be sensitive public policy that affects the relative 
costs abortion and childbearing. Though it is debatable how strongly individuals weigh costs 
when making childbearing decisions, welfare benefits theoretically make the payoff structure 
associated with childrearing more attractive than it would be in their absence (Akerlof, Yellen, 
and Katz 1996; Joyce and Kaestner 1996; Leibowitz, Eisen, and Chow 1986). 
Finally, a case for social welfare programs as capacity-building tools in a reproductive 
rights context comes from potential target populations. Grassroots activists among low-income 
women and women of color, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, argued government 
violated their right to bear children when it failed to provide them with health care and other 
economic resources necessary to properly raise a family (Dugger 1998; Nelson 2003; Solinger 
2001). Historians claimed that the modern feminist movement alienated black women during its 
formative years because its emphasis on abortion and other means of freeing women from 
motherhood and the home did not speak to women of color, who largely worked drudge jobs and 
could not yet take motherhood for granted (hooks 1984; Nelson 2003). With considerably more 
support this time from the reproductive rights movement (Joffe 1998), advocates for low-income 
women during the most recent round of welfare reform argued again that cuts in social welfare 
endangered their right to bear children (Jencks and Edin 1995; Roberts 1999). 
Though many presume that social welfare generosity should reduce abortions, we know 
very little about whether it actually does. Despite voluminous research on whether welfare 8
benefits encourage nonmarital childbearing,
1 the academic community has not reached 
consensus on this issue (Moffitt 1997). An individual-level analysis of pregnant teenagers in one 
California town found that welfare receipt was positively associated with the decision to 
continue a pregnancy (Leibowitz, Eisen, and Chow 1986). In a three-state study, expansions in 
the eligibility of pregnant women and infants for another social welfare program, Medicaid, were 
associated with substantial decreases in the probability that an unmarried, nonblack woman with 
no high school diploma would obtain an abortion (Joyce and Kaestner 1996). 
No study appears to have examined child care policy’s relationship to abortion, though 
several have indicated that expected or actual fertility decreases when child care is costlier or 
more scarce. Those that considered child care subsidies or tax credits found they helped mitigate 
this effect (Blau and Robins 1989; Blau and Robins 1991; Del Boca 2002; Lehrer and Kawasaki 
1985; Mason and Kuhlthau 1992; Presser and Baldwin 1980; Rindfuss and Brewster 1996). 
Child care availability and affordability, including public subsidization of child care, are 
significantly associated with mothers’ labor force status (Bainbridge, Meyers, and Waldfogel 
2003; Blau and Robins 1989; Blau and Robins 1991; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Mason and 
Kuhlthau 1992; Presser and Baldwin 1980), appearing to help some women to maintain their 
employment and career aspirations in spite of parenthood.
An alternative hypothesis, that welfare programs may increase abortions, remains 
plausible, though the balance of theory suggests that welfare programs should improve women’s 
capacity to choose childbearing in those cases where economic need is the major reason why 
pregnancy is a problem. First, alongside any women who turn to abortion because of their 
                                                
1 This research does not concern itself with abortion. Its theory usually focuses on pre-
conception rather than post-conception decisions.  9
economic need may be women whose inability to pay prevents them from terminating a 
pregnancy. This latter concern motivates advocates of publicly funded abortion, but could also 
be alleviated by general welfare assistance. In countries like the United States where the means-
tested welfare state is relatively small (Skocpol 1995) and most families cannot live on public 
assistance alone (Edin and Lein 1997), welfare programs may more successfully help women 
who desire abortion to fulfill their preferences than women desiring a child. Over the long term, 
child care assistance specifically could dampen fertility (possibly via abortion) by increasing 
mothers’ attachment to the labor force (Presser and Baldwin 1980). 
Another reason for a positive relationship between welfare participation and abortion 
concerns the orientation of the welfare state toward indigent women’s childbearing. Departments 
of social services have notorious histories of intrusion into the intimate lives of their clients (Bell 
1965; Mink 1998; Piven and Cloward 1993), and some suggest that the concern with nonmarital 
childbearing in the latest round of welfare reform is resulting in a similar though subtler pattern 
(Hays 2003). Welfare rhetoric and welfare rules, some argue, work together to discourage and 
devalue motherhood among those poor, often black, women who choose to deliver and raise their 
children (Hays 2003; Roberts 1999; Roberts 1995; Seccombe 1999). One scholar argued in the 
Journal of Black Studies, “ensuring that poor women do not reproduce has become one of the 
most popular welfare reform proposals of the 1990s” (Thomas 1998, p. 420). 
Participants in programs for the able-bodied poor may be especially vulnerable to cues 
received from welfare offices since office culture and design emphasize strict adherence to 
program rules. Clients quickly learn caseworkers’ power over them, and that the best way to get 
what they need is to keep quiet and do as told (Soss 1999). On the other hand, any messages 
welfare recipients receive about their reproductive behavior need not be malintentioned. One 10
study of a welfare office found social workers bending the rules to help the women they served, 
including arranging for money to fund some clients’ abortions (Hays 2003). To some this may be 
suppression of fertility, but to others, empowerment in exercising one’s own choices. 
A third scenario is that welfare benefits may have no effect. While economic need ranks 
among the most important reasons why women choose abortion, most respondents give multiple 
reasons for the decision (Faria, Barrett, and Goodman 1985; Torres and Forrest 1988).
Against these alternatives, the remainder of this paper tests the hypothesis that low-
income women’s likelihood of choosing abortion will decrease as their access to and 
participation in social welfare programs increases. Secondarily, it notes how any reduction in 
abortion associated with social welfare programs compares to that achieved by alternative policy 
tools: the private safety net and limitations on abortion access.
Data and Methods
Data come from the restricted version of the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing study 
conducted by Princeton University’s Center for Research on Child Wellbeing and the Columbia 
University School of Social Work’s Social Indicators Survey Center. Beginning in the late 
1990s, researchers interviewed a sample of 4,898 mothers upon the birth of a child (the “focal 
child”). Most were re-interviewed when this child was 12-18 months old and again when the 
child was three. Mothers were questioned extensively about their receipt of public and private 
assistance and about economic hardships in their lives. They were also asked whether they had 
been pregnant since the birth of the focal child and about the outcome of those pregnancies. I 
draw most of my data from the one-year follow-up study, pulling data from the first and third 
wave files when appropriate. 11
Since the restricted version of the data includes the mother’s city of residence, I am able 
to link these data with social welfare and abortion policies in each mother’s state (see appendix). 
I confine my analysis to women who became pregnant between the birth of the focal 
child and their second interview. Following some minor coding decisions that are enumerated in 
the appendix, I am left with a sample of 850 women, 26 percent of whom had ended at least one 
pregnancy in abortion. The appendix contains demographic summary statistics.
Admittedly, these data do not represent the population of pregnant American women. 
Because the study’s focus is on unmarried parents (“fragile families”), the sample was drawn 
from hospitals where large numbers of single mothers delivered, located in 20 American cities 
(listed in the appendix) of 200,000 or more residents (Bendheim-Thoman Center for Research on 
Child Wellbeing 2003; 2004). The study thus disproportionately captures unmarried women, 
women of color, urban women and women of low socioeconomic status. Further, since they 
entered the study through childbirth, all respondents had at least one child. These women may 
face a less dramatic life change and different opportunity costs compared those who have not 
experienced parenthood, and a prior birth may indicate a preference for childbearing. 
Though this paper’s findings generalize only to urban, relatively low-SES mothers, on a 
topic where data are scarce the Fragile Families sampling design actually improves suitability of 
these data for studying the role of social welfare programs in women’s reproductive decisions. 
Because most people are not eligible for the welfare programs under consideration without being 
parents, results from a correlational study that included childless women would be biased. The 
sample’s low socioeconomic status also improves prospects for disentangling the effect of 
welfare programs from the effect of a low income, since most respondents have some degree of 
economic need. Nearly 54 percent of women in the sample report at least one instance of severe 12
economic hardship (defined in the appendix) in the previous year, such as going hungry, falling 
short of money to pay the rent or mortgage, having electricity cut off, or forgoing needed 
medical treatment. While half of the sample reports an annual income of over $60,000, this 
figure is deceptive. Respondents were asked the total pretax income of all people living with 
them from all sources, not just wages. Adults per household averaged 2.2 and ranged up to 10, 
and this was positively correlated with income.
Women with previous births are also not as small a subset of abortion patients as some 
may believe. Such women made up over 60 percent of abortion patients in 2000. Women with 
one previous live birth terminated pregnancies at a considerably higher rate (32 abortions per 
1000 women) than women with no previous live births (19 per 1000); abortion rates among 
women with two or more previous live births were comparable to those with none (18 abortions 
per 1000 women) (Jones, Darroch, and Henshaw 2002).
The dependent variable for this analysis is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the respondent 
reported resolving a pregnancy in abortion. An important issue involves the quality of abortion 
reporting, since researchers believe most survey data on this sensitive topic is beleaguered by 
substantial underreporting (Jagannathan 2001; Jones and Forrest 1992). Some national data 
suggest that reporting in the Fragile Families study may be fairly complete. In 2000, nearly a 
quarter of pregnancies (excluding miscarriages, thus inflating the figure) ended in abortion (Finer 
and Henshaw 2003); of those pregnancies that had been completed by the one-year interview, 
nearly half ended in abortion. These two statistics are not directly comparable, though, so a 
concern about underreporting cannot be entirely dismissed. Some women in the study would not 
have had enough time to recover their fertility and bear another child. Some characteristics of the 13
women oversampled—urban, unmarried, minority, and low-SES—predict higher abortion rates 
than the population’s, while their 2.3 children predict lower rates (Finer and Henshaw 2003).
I employ three measures of respondents’ access to and participation in social welfare 
programs.
2 The first is an index of the number of welfare programs from which a respondent had 
received assistance in the previous 12 months, coded to range from 0-1. I consider cash welfare, 
food stamps, public health insurance, child care subsidies, the Earned Income Tax Credit, the 
Women, Infants, and Children Nutrition Program (WIC), and public housing and rental 
assistance.
3 I also consider the generosity of a woman’s potential safety net, measured by per 
capita spending on public welfare in her state. These figures are adjusted using the 2004 version 
of Berry, Fording, and Hanson’s state cost of living index (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2000). 
On a subsample of respondents who were or believed themselves to be eligible for public 
assistance, my third measure is an indicator of whether a woman failed to receive assistance. 
This group includes women who did not apply for welfare or food stamps, or whose applications 
were denied. It also includes respondents report they are eligible for but not currently receiving 
child care subsidies, and women whose cash welfare benefits have been reduced or eliminated 
because they did not fulfill program requirements. I hypothesize that all measures of welfare 
receipt and welfare generosity will be associated with a lower likelihood of abortion, and that 
this effect should show up most strongly when looking only at the poorest mothers.
                                                
2 A simple indicator of whether or not a respondent had received assistance did not vary enough 
to justify its use. Only 23 women had not participated in at least one of 7 programs considered. 
3 Initially I also included Supplemental Security Income and an “other assistance” category, but 
later dropped these because they did not scale well with the other measures. 14
Because conservative Republicans rhetorically place primary responsibility for the safety 
net with families, churches, and other private actors, and further argue that privately provided 
assistance is more effective than public assistance, I also include two measures of the nonpublic 
safety net. The first is a scale indicating the number of areas in which a respondent received help 
from family, friends, or other nongovernmental sources: money, child care (financial aid or 
relative care), and housing (lives rent-free with relatives, friends, or others). The second is 
another scale measuring the number of situations in which the respondents could “count on” 
someone to provide the following: loans of $200 or $1000, emergency child care, a place to live, 
or a co-signature for loans of $1000 or $5000. I expect that women with more private assistance 
at their disposal will also be less likely to choose abortion.
Abortion access is measured with the ratio of abortion providers to state population and 
with indicators of whether a state was enforcing each of three policies in 2000: a ban on the use 
of state Medicaid funds for abortions, a requirement for parental consent or notification prior to a 
minor’s abortion, and a law mandating waiting periods and the provision of specific information 
to women seeking abortion. Because these four measures were highly correlated and 
theoretically related (Hansen 1980; Wetstein 1996), I formed one abortion access factor. Women 
should be more likely to choose abortion when residing in states where it is more accessible.
Family planning advocates argue that improved access to contraception will reduce 
abortion. According to this hypothesis, women living in states that have provided better access to 
family planning should be less likely to choose abortion, as more of the pregnancies that do 
occur will be intended. While the federal government sets and funds most family planning 
policy, some notable state-level variation exists (Schwalberg et al. 2001). I thus form a scale of 
four state family planning policies on which there is substantial variation, as of January 2001: a 15
mandate that all prescription drug plans cover contraceptives, whether states add their own funds 
to family planning programs, Medicaid coverage of emergency contraception, and Section 1115 
waivers that expand Medicaid family planning eligibility beyond federal income guidelines. 
Models also control for economic hardship,
4 age, marital status, education, race (black or 
nonblack), whether a respondent is employed or in school, domestic violence (abuse by the 
father of the focal child or current partner), and moral predisposition toward abortion. Since the 
survey does not include questions about abortion attitudes, I proxy this latter concept with an 
indicator of whether or not the respondent attends religious services at least once a week.
5 One 
model interacts welfare variables with race and marital status, as some previous research has 
revealed differences in how welfare participation and marriage status affect the reproductive 
behavior of black versus nonblack women (Joyce and Kaestner 1996; Moffitt 1997; Trent and 
Powell-Griner 1991). I also allow the effects of economic hardship and the nongovernmental 
safety net to vary by race. Models reported are logistic regression models.
Results
As expected, simple descriptive statistics indicate a fairly solid link between economic 
hardship and the likelihood of abortion. Table 1 shows the proportion of women choosing 
abortion, by their economic experiences over the previous 12 months. Significantly higher 
                                                
4 Income lacks response options above the sample median. It has no predictive power even by 
itself, even when the relationship is not constrained to be linear.
5 Church attendance powerfully predicted the abortion decision in a bivariate model, while an 
alternative measure based on respondents’ agreement with traditional gender roles and the 
superiority of marriage to cohabitation was unrelated to the abortion decision. The survey’s 
measure of religious affiliation is inadequate because one cannot distinguish between Christians.16
percentages of women who reported at least one of 12 economic hardships terminated their 
pregnancies—31 percent, as opposed to 20 percent of other women. A gap of similar magnitude 
exists between women whose welfare benefits were cut because of program noncompliance and
women who received full benefits. The proportions choosing abortion among women with 
unreliable child care arrangements or who quit a job or schooling due to lack of child care were 
18 and 15 percentage points greater than those of other employees and students. 
On the other hand, the expected negative relationship does not appear between welfare 
program participation and the proportion of women turning to abortion (Table 1). While four 
programs show no significant differences, significantly higher (p<.05) proportions of women 
among cash welfare, WIC, and child care subsidy recipients ended a pregnancy in abortion. The 
case of child care subsidy recipients is most striking: 46 percent of subsidy recipients ended a 
pregnancy in abortion, compared to 24 percent of other employees and students.
Several considerations may explain these findings. First, program participation may be 
picking up the effect of economic hardship rather than public assistance. A significant 38 percent 
of mothers who had been unable to afford at least one basic need were cash welfare clients, as 
opposed to 31 percent of those who did not report such severe need. Besides their low incomes, 
recipients of public assistance have other characteristics common among abortion patients: they 
are disproportionately black (Jones, Darroch, and Henshaw 2002; Schram 2003) and unmarried. 
Compared to all women, greater proportions of welfare recipients (Tolman and Raphael 2000)
and abortion patients (Glander et al. 1998) suffer from domestic violence. Further, since state 
policy liberalism on one dimension highly correlates with policy liberalism on other dimensions 
(Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993), states offering more generous welfare programs may also 17
have more liberal abortion policies. By some measures, they do (Schroedel 2000), and this may 
create the appearance of a positive relationship between welfare generosity and abortion.
In practice, however, controlling for these concerns does not dramatically reduce the 
positive relationship between welfare program participation and the abortion decision. Table 2 
reports results from logistic regression models. Columns 1-4 consider all mothers for whom data 
are available, while columns 5 and 6 consider roughly the lowest third of the sample’s income 
distribution, women whose total household incomes from all sources fall under $30,000. 
Columns 3 and 6 analyze subsamples of these two groups, women who are eligible or believe 
they were eligible during the previous year for welfare, food stamps, or child care assistance.
Findings from the logistic regression models continue to contradict expectations of the 
theory that welfare enables childbearing. In columns 1 and 2, the number of social welfare 
programs from which a family receives assistance actually predicts a marginally significant 
increase in the odds that a pregnant woman would choose abortion, nearly doubling the odds for 
women who take part in all seven welfare programs as opposed to none. Holding all other 
predictors constant at their means, an increase in program participation from one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with an 
increase of about 6 percentage points in the probability that a pregnant woman would choose 
abortion (from 18.7 percent to 24.5 percent, using column 1).
6 This positive relationship persists 
across various specifications of the model. 
While increased welfare program participation is positively related to an abortion 
decision for women of all four combinations of race and marital status, the magnitude of the 
relationship is uneven (column 4). Welfare program participation and abortion are more tightly 
                                                
6 Predicted probabilities were computed with CLARIFY 2.1 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).18
linked among black married women than any other demographic group. Since the effects of a 
single variable become increasingly difficult to interpret as two- and three-way interactions are 
added to logistic regression models, a comparison of predicted probabilities sheds more light on 
the association between welfare participation and abortion for each group. When moving from 
one standard deviation below each group-specific mean for program participation, the predicted 
increases in the probability of abortion are 2.3, 6.6, and 2.2 percentage points for black 
unmarried women, white unmarried women, and white married women, respectively. For black 
married women, however, the increase in welfare participation is associated with a statistically 
significant (p<.05) 15.8 percentage point jump in the probability of choosing abortion, from 3.8 
percent for those at one standard deviation below the mean to 19.6 percent.
The hypothesis that social welfare programs reduce the likelihood of abortion is also 
soundly rejected when considering the generosity of state safety nets. In all specifications for the 
full sample, women’s probability of choosing abortion significantly increases with their state’s 
per capita welfare spending. Using column 1, the estimated probability is 17.6 percent in states 
one standard deviation below the mean welfare spending ($509 per capita, similar to California’s 
cost-of-living adjusted spending) but 26.0 percent in states one standard deviation above the 
mean ($815 per capita, similar to Massachusetts’ adjusted spending). When allowed to vary by 
race and marital status (column 4), the change in predicted probabilities is significant only for 
unmarried white women, raising their probability of abortion by 12.4 percentage points.
When the sample is narrowed to pregnant women who are or believe themselves to be 
eligible for welfare, food stamps, or child care subsidies, the direction of the welfare effect also 
defies expectations of the capacity-building theory (column 3). The group expected to be worst 
off—women who have lost some or all of their cash welfare benefits for program 19
noncompliance, who have had their applications for assistance turned down, or who did not 
apply for assistance—actually appears slightly less likely to choose abortion than women 
currently receiving assistance at their full benefit levels. 
It remains possible that program participation still captures poverty’s effect. Repeating 
analysis only on respondents in the bottom third of the income distribution yields a mixed 
judgment. Significance levels for welfare program participation and state welfare generosity drop 
with the smaller sample, but the sizes of the odds ratios change little (column 5). The direction of 
the welfare effect, however, does conform to expectations among the lowest-income, assistance-
eligible women (column 6). For them, a loss of benefits or a failure to obtain assistance is 
associated with an increase in abortion incidence, estimated at 5.8 percentage points.  
The nongovernmental safety net has an ambiguous and, for the most part, statistically 
insignificant relationship with women’s odds of choosing abortion. Women who know they can 
count on someone for help when in a bind are somewhat less likely to choose abortion (column 
2), but the odds ratio on private assistance received behaves differently. An increase in the 
number of sources from which a family receives nongovernmental assistance is positively 
(though not significantly) related to the odds of choosing abortion. Substantial correlation 
between this measure and the scale of public assistance received (ρ=.45) suggests that public and 
private assistance complement, rather than substitute for, each other. No statistically significant 
differences emerge when the effect of the private assistance is allowed to vary by race.
The estimated effects of control variables are consistent across models and generally in 
the expected direction, with only a few exceptions. A woman’s likelihood of choosing abortion is 
strongly and positively related to the accessibility of abortion services in her state. The predicted 
probability of choosing abortion climbs sharply, from 16.2 percent to 28 percent, when moving 20
from one standard deviation below the mean for abortion access to one standard deviation above 
the mean and setting other variables in column 1 at their means. Women currently employed or 
in school are considerably more likely to abort. Black women and unmarried women have 
significantly higher odds of ending a pregnancy in abortion, while the odds are marginally lower 
for churchgoing women. All else equal, the odds of abortion decrease substantially with each 
biological child, perhaps representing women’s relative preference for motherhood, though they 
do increase with age. With other controls in place, educational attainment is not significantly 
related to the abortion decision except when considering the least educated of the lowest-income 
women. Women with a recent history of domestic abuse are more likely to turn to abortion.
The one relationship that differs noticeably from expectations is that between family 
planning access and women’s abortion decisions. Women living in states whose public policy 
has made contraception more affordable are actually more likely to resolve a pregnancy in 
abortion. Part of this story may be the correlation between state family planning policy and state 
abortion policy (ρ=.65). Also, the measure does not reflect individual contraceptive decisions. 
In an attempt to explain the unexpected positive relationship between social welfare 
programs and abortion, I next consider that public assistance clients may be receiving cues from 
caseworkers and program rules that may encourage or facilitate pregnancy termination. As 
previously discussed, some believe a family cap would increase abortions among welfare 
recipients because benefits would be spread more thinly in the family. Passage of a family cap 
may also signify a state welfare bureaucracy’s orientation toward discouraging childbearing, one 
that may manifest itself in subtler ways relating to how caseworkers deal with their clients. 
A second policy I consider is whether state law prohibits certain public employees from 
providing abortion information or referrals, since it is plausible that some caseworkers may 21
routinely distribute this information to their pregnant clients. This type of policy is of still more 
recent vintage, as most states had just begun passing these laws in the late 1990s. There is also 
considerable variation in the scope of public employees or grantees covered by the law, and 
public assistance caseworkers are never explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, if at least some 
social service providers who interact with assistance recipients are forbidden from discussing 
abortion, the relationship between abortion and welfare program participation may diminish.
Table 3 shows results from models that incorporate these laws and interact them with a 
woman’s welfare program participation. We see some support for the hypothesis that state 
welfare bureaucracies mediate the relationship between welfare and women’s abortion decisions. 
The welfare-abortion link is magnified for women living in states with family caps and 
diminished in states with restrictions on public employees’ abortion counseling. Again, predicted 
probabilities ease interpretation. The welfare participation of women living in states with family 
caps (from one standard deviation below to one above the mean) is associated with a 6.8 
percentage point increase in the probability of choosing abortion, while this increase is about half 
a percentage point in states without family caps. For women living in states that do not prohibit 
public employees from providing abortion information or referrals, the 2-standard deviation 
increase in welfare program participation predicts a significant (p<.05) 8.8 percentage point 
increase in the probability of choosing abortion. While not attaining statistical significance, there 
is a 4.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of choosing abortion associated with welfare 
participation in states that limit public employees’ discussion of abortion. 
Discussion
This study indicates that abortion is a more common pregnancy resolution among women 
who are severely economically disadvantaged and women whose balance between work and 22
family has been particularly stressful. But contrary to theory that social welfare programs would 
build the capacity of low-income women to choose childbearing, this study found that access to 
and participation in social welfare programs predicted an increase in the probability that a 
pregnant woman would choose abortion, at least among low-SES, urban women with at least one 
child. Does this study vindicate the Republican platform of restricting welfare spending as well 
as abortion access? Not necessarily—such a conclusion would be premature in light of the rest of 
this study’s results and other possible explanations of this finding.
First, welfare bureaucracies appear to condition the existence and magnitude of a 
relationship between program participation and abortion. As a woman’s exposure to the welfare 
system increases, so does her potential for exposure to cues regarding her reproductive decisions. 
The odds of resolving a pregnancy in abortion increase considerably for program participants 
living in states that deny additional assistance to new children born to welfare families or whose 
public employees are not constrained by law from providing abortion information to clients. 
Meanwhile, increased program participation does not affect the probability of choosing abortion 
among women in states without family caps, and it may even decrease abortion usage in states 
where some public employees or grantees are forbidden from abortion counseling. How actively 
caseworkers encourage or facilitate welfare clients’ abortions, and whether these activities help 
women achieve their true reproductive preferences or pressure them out of childbearing is a 
matter for future research. 
Differences by race and marital status in how program participation and welfare access 
are linked to abortion usage also suggest that it is not necessarily public assistance itself that 
encourages abortion. While positive for all groups, these findings are driven by the experience of 
married black women and unmarried white women. This too bears further investigation, but it 23
may have something do with other, less measurable correlates of abortion, such as women’s 
visions of their futures (Feldt 2002; Swope 1998). In American society, married black women 
and unmarried white women generally may fall somewhere between the other two groups in their 
prospects for future economic security. These groups of women may be on the cusp of “making 
it,” but heavier reliance on public assistance may signify a tenuous hold on these prospects. For 
these women especially, an additional child may appear to make or break their economic futures. 
One may argue that the present analysis has still not adequately separated welfare 
participation from economic hardship, especially considering the positive relationship observed 
between receipt of private aid and the odds of choosing abortion. On the other hand, this 
sample’s receipt of private and public assistance are related. Public agencies have long partnered 
with nongovernmental organizations to deliver services to the poor (Salamon 1995), while the 
1996 welfare reform and President Bush’s faith-based initiative have continued to encourage this 
practice. We cannot know from these data how much private assistance women received in this 
fashion. Additionally, similarities in results when welfare generosity is measured at the state 
rather than the individual level weigh against the hardship explanation. 
Other possible reasons for abortion’s link with welfare participation and welfare 
generosity cannot be directly tested with these data and may be avenues for future research.
One concerns the aforementioned size of welfare benefits in the United States. Scholars 
have called the United States unusually stingy in its welfare spending relative to other developed 
countries (Skocpol 1995). In this sample, welfare checks averaged $324 a month. This relatively 
small amount of assistance is probably not enough to truly help a poor woman afford another 
child (Edin and Lein 1997). It may be enough, however, to help her afford the abortion she may 
not otherwise have been able to pay for, especially in states where Medicaid does not fund the 24
procedure. This situation is perhaps the most plausible explanation for the link between state 
welfare generosity and abortion usage. Since interstate variation in welfare benefits is relatively 
small and exhibits spatial patterns (Schram, Nitz, and Krueger 1998; Volden 2002), one must 
likely look outside U.S. borders to find a welfare state whose benefits are effectively “capacity-
building.”
The time frame of this study may also influence the direction of the findings. The Fragile 
Families study was fielded entirely during the post-welfare reform era. Welfare recipients were 
subject not only to provisions like the family cap, but to more rigorous work requirements, to 
limits on their lifetime years of welfare receipt, and a dizzying array of rules related to “personal 
responsibility” whose violation could result in a loss of benefits. At the time of these interviews 
(1999-2002), the two-to-five year clocks set by states for lifetime benefit receipt were beginning 
to expire. In theory, welfare recipients faced greater uncertainty about their future since they 
were no longer legally entitled to public assistance, and this prospect may have led many to 
exercise more caution in their childbearing. While a study has yet to establish a causal or even 
correlational role for welfare policy, poor women made up a noticeably larger share of abortion 
patients in 2000 than they had in 1994, before welfare reform (Finer et al. 2005; Jones, Darroch, 
and Henshaw 2002).
Factors influencing selection into welfare programs may also moderate participation’s 
link with abortion. In order to establish and maintain their eligibility for assistance, program 
participants must be aware of the assistance available, know program rules, and stay on top off 
volumes of paperwork (Hays 2003). Women who display this level of information savvy are 
likely also more capable of acquiring information about how to obtain a desired abortion. If 25
welfare recipients share common social networks, they may also be able to share this latter 
information with each other. 
Finally, though this research finds no statistically significant evidence that welfare 
programs build the capacity of urban, low-SES mothers to choose childbearing, this may not 
necessarily be the case among other women, especially those with no prior children. The women 
in this sample know firsthand the challenges of childrearing, as well as the rewards. The 
marginal increases in public assistance—if any—may make less of a difference to the budgets of 
families already in the system than they would for women whose entrance into motherhood 
qualifies them for a large range of assistance programs. This may especially be the case for 
women’s whose employment prospects are especially bleak.
Additional limitations of this research design also caution against the conclusion that 
welfare programs encourage abortion. This analysis is correlational, not causal. We know only 
that respondents reported a particular pregnancy outcome within the previous 12-18 months and 
particular experience with the social welfare system or with hardship in the previous 12 months. 
We do not know that these events were related or even the order in which they occurred over that 
time period. Respondents may not have applied for child care subsidies or for food stamps until 
after terminating a pregnancy. Nevertheless, this is a drawback shared by many studies using 
survey research, and these data appear to be the best available for studying this question.
Finally, the theory itself could be wrong. Women’s pregnancy decisions may be still less 
sensitive to costs than believed. Welfare benefits may be capacity-building in other aspects of an 
individual’s life, but not in decision-making that is so deeply personal (though highly politicized) 
as the decision between abortion and childbirth.26
In this study, the authority tool—abortion regulations and provider supply—appeared 
considerably more effective at reducing abortions than the capacity-building tool, social welfare 
programs. Of course, this study has not tested whether women in states with more restrictive 
abortion policy are forgoing abortions they would have otherwise preferred. It could be that more 
restrictive abortion policy simply indicates lower tolerance of abortion among political elites and 
the mass public (Gerber 1996; Wetstein 1996), but my focus on enforcement rather than passage 
of a law should mitigate this concern. Low-income mothers living in states with more restrictive 
abortion policy climates are less likely to choose abortion. Regardless of the mechanism by 
which these laws work—by actually preventing women from obtaining abortions, as their 
opponents contest, or by changing women’s minds, as proponents argue—state abortion policy 
appears highly relevant to women’s decisions. But we cannot entirely dismiss cultural 
explanations. The unexpected positive coefficient on family planning access, for example, may 
be joining abortion policy in tapping into the liberality of a population’s sexual attitudes. Some 
economic models have connected these attitudes as well as the prevalence of abortion and 
contraceptive use to increased sexual activity and thus increased opportunities for unintended 
pregnancy (Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz 1996).
Clearly state policy appears related to individual behavior, even in behavior as personal 
as childbearing and abortion. This is the case regardless of policy tool, capacity-building or 
authority, though the hypothesis that welfare participation and generosity should reduce abortion 
was not supported for this sample. Our ability to reach a more general verdict on the politically 
attractive argument that welfare is “pro-life” may ultimately require comparative data that do not 
yet exist, or much greater expansion and variation in the American states’ welfare efforts.27
Appendix
Cities included in the Fragile Families Study:
Austin, TX Detroit, MI New York, NY Pittsburgh, PA
Baltimore, MD Indianapolis, IN Nashville, TN Richmond, VA
Boston, MA Jacksonville, FL Norfolk, VA San Antonio, TX
Chicago, IL Milwaukee, WI Oakland, CA San Jose, CA
Corpus Christi, TX Newark, NJ Philadelphia, PA Toledo, OH
Key Variable Definitions and Coding:
Pregnancy Outcome:  Abortion=1; baby, miscarriage or stillbirth and no additional abortion= 0. 
Women experiencing miscarriage or stillbirth receive this code because they resemble the birth 
group more so than the abortion group on many key variables, and coefficient size changes little 
when they are removed from the sample. Over 40 percent of respondents were pregnant the time 
of the interview, so I assigned pregnancy outcomes using the study’s third wave. If R reported a 
miscarriage or abortion in addition to a birth at the third wave interview, I assigned pregnancy
outcome based on the third-wave ages of children and time between interviews. I coded 31 
women who did not participate in the third wave with no abortion because only one of the other 
women’s third wave responses indicated she had later terminated that pregnancy. I excluded 27 
women who had reported being pregnant at the one-year interview but at the 3-year interview 
reported no birth, abortion, or miscarriage. 
Economic need/economic hardship: Coded 1 if R reported at least one of the following because 
there wasn’t enough money: received free food or meals; went hungry; child(ren) went hungry; 
did not pay full amount of rent/mortgage; evicted from home; did not pay full amount of utility 
bill; gas or electric turned off; telephone disconnected; borrowed money to help pay bills; moved 
in with others; spent at least one night in a shelter, abandoned building, car, etc.; anyone in 
household did not make a needed doctor or hospital visit.
Number of welfare programs: See text. Scale ranges 0-1, mean .421, standard deviation .267.28
State welfare generosity: Per capita state spending on “public welfare” in 2000, from Statistical 
Abstract of the United States. COLA-adjusted mean=662.40, standard deviation=152.68. 
Private assistance received: See text. Scales ranges 0-1, mean .404, standard deviation .318.
Expected support: See text. Scales ranges 0-1, mean .628, standard deviation .302.
Abortion access: Ranges –1.03-1.42, mean 0, standard deviation 1. Provider numbers are 
published in Finer and Henshaw (2003) and divided by Census 2000 state population (in 
100,000s). Abortion policy data come mainly from NARAL Pro-Choice America (2005; 2001). 
To resolve ambiguities regarding enforcement status or exceptions to the laws, National Right to 
Life Committee fact sheets, online news coverage, and the laws themselves were consulted.
Family planning access: See text. Scale ranges 0-1, mean 0.43, standard deviation of .282. Data 
on laws regarding insurance coverage for contraceptives come from NARAL Pro-Choice 
America (2005; 2001). Remaining family planning policy data come from a Health Systems 
Research survey of state officials for the Kaiser Family Foundation (Schwalberg et al. 2001). 
Sample summary statistics:
Mean Standard Dev. Observations
Age 24.7 5.4 846
Number of biological children 2.3 1.4 850
Married 0.253 0.434 850
Black 0.559 0.497 841
Less than high school diploma 0.381 0.486 848
Some college 0.265 0.442 848
College graduate 0.064 0.244 848
Weekly church attendee 0.261  0.440 849
Employed or in school 0.580 0.494 849
Economic hardship in last year 0.536 0.499 850
Cash welfare in last year 0.348 0.477 850
Food stamps in last year 0.475 0.500 848
Child care subsidy (current recipient) 0.097 0.296 849
WIC in last year 0.785 0.411 848
Housing assistance (current recipient) 0.250 0.433 839
Medicaid/public health ins. (current recipient) 0.258 0.438 423
Earned Income Tax Credit (applied) 0.331 0.471 782
Chose abortion 0.258 0.438 85029
Table 1. Proportion of women choosing abortion, by economic experience
Economic issue Proportion Choosing Abortion
Inability to afford at least one basic need# 30.9**
Welfare benefits cut for noncompliance with requirements 41.9*
Welfare benefits cut or assistance application denied 29.3
Quit job or school because of lack of child care 45.0**
Child care fell through multiple times in previous month 47.4**
No emergency child care 27.0
No health insurance 23.0
Welfare recipient 30.1**
Food stamps recipient 26.1
WIC recipient 27.8**
Medicaid recipient 26.6
Housing assistance recipient 29.1
Applied for Earned Income Tax Credit 30.9*
Child care subsidy recipient 46.0**
Possibly eligible but no benefits 29.3
Overall Sample 25.8
#See “economic hardship” in appendix for definition. **Significantly different at .05 from 
appropriate comparison group (i.e., other employed women, other welfare recipients) *p<.1030
Table 2. Social Welfare and Other Factors in Women’s Abortion Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number welfare 
programs
1.921* 1.873* 2.242 1.788
State welfare generosity 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002** 1.002*
Benefits cut/not received 0.922 1.376
Private assistance 1.135 1.247 1.354
Expected support 0.880 0.662 0.966
Economic hardship 1.581** 1.537** 1.641** 1.587 1.240 0.914
Abortion access 1.428*** 1.429*** 1.407** 1.395*** 1.063 1.008
Family planning access 1.537 1.539 1.773 1.605 9.143*** 10.717***
Employed or in school 1.871*** 1.874*** 1.782** 1.846*** 2.476*** 1.910*
Less than HS diploma 0.851 0.850 0.795 0.828 0.536* .613
Some college 0.789 0.797 0.779 0.777 0.827 1.242
College graduate 0.810 0.810 0.445 0.787 -- --
Married 0.327*** 0.329*** .026*** 0.843 0.426 0.297*
Black 1.680*** 1.671*** 1.785** 3.496 1.680 1.602
Number of children 0.709*** 0.708*** 0.718*** 0.698*** 0.606*** 0.626***
Age 1.041* 1.041* 1.047* 1.046** 1.078** 1.083*
Religious 0.694* 0.695* 1.008 0.711 0.729 0.807























N 832 832 557 832 273 216
Figures are odds ratios from logistic regression. *p<.10, **p<.05., ***p<.01, two-tailed tests31
Table 3. Welfare Bureaucracies and the Abortion-Social Welfare Link
(1) (2)





State welfare generosity 1.001 1.001**
Abortion access 1.499*** 1.390***
Family planning access 1.983 1.561
Economic hardship 1.575** 1.624***
Employed or in school 1.913*** 1.823***
Less than HS diploma 0.852 0.875
Some college 0.788 0.808
College graduate 0.821 0.855
Married 0.311*** 0.329***
Black 1.773*** 1.724***
Number of children 0.714** 0.709***
Age 1.038* 1.040*
Religious 0.705 0.705
Domestic abuse 1.837** 1.854**
N 834 834
Figures are odds ratios from logistic regression. *p<.10, **p<.05., ***p<.01, two-tailed tests32
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